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Abstract. This paper presents a novel yet efficient defense framework
for segmentation models against adversarial attacks in medical imaging.
In contrary to the defense methods against adversarial attacks for classi-
fication models which widely are investigated, such defense methods for
segmentation models has been less explored. Our proposed method can
be used for any deep learning models without revising the target deep
learning models, as well as can be independent of adversarial attacks. Our
framework consists of a frequency domain converter, a detector, and a
reformer. The frequency domain converter helps the detector detects ad-
versarial examples by using a frame domain of an image. The reformer
helps target models to predict more precisely. We have experiments to
empirically show that our proposed method has a better performance
compared to the existing defense method.
Keywords: Deep Learning · Adversarial attacks · Image segmentation
· Medical imaging
1 Introduction
Recently, Deep learning plays an important role on medical industry since the
deep learning system makes it possible to help medical imaging segmentation
to identify the pixels of different lesions or organs in medical imaging such as
MRI images. However, many researchers discovered that the deep learning neu-
ral networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples[3, 11]. To defend against
the adversarial attacks, numerous defense algorithms and methods have been
introduced and can be grouped under different approaches: (1) training the tar-
get deep learning neural networks with the adversarial examples to be more
robust; namely adversarial training[3, 11] (2) changing training procedures of
the target deep learning models for the attackers hard to attack by reducing the
magnitude of gradient, e.g.,defensive distillation[12] and (3) building a defense
framework, which is independent of the adversarial attacks, to defend the tar-
get deep learning models against any adversarial attacks[5, 17]. However, All of
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these approaches have limitations. (1) needs the specific adversarial examples to
train the models, so it is only resistant against the limited adversarial attacks.
For (2), this approach does not show a good defensive performance against some
of the adversarial attacks. (3) shows good generalization and robustness against
any adversarial attacks, but some of the defense frameworks only prove their
capacities against the small size of images and it is still a challenging task to
appropriately train and tune for some of the defense frameworks.
The related works for our proposed defense method are defense approach (3).
This approach does not need to modify the target models, as well as it does not
need to know any knowledge of the process for crafting adversarial examples.
MagNet[5] and Defense-GAN[17] are known for this approach. MagNet is cre-
ated to defend the neural network classifiers against the adversarial examples
in 2017. MagNet consists of a detector and a reformer. The detector discerns
between normal images and adversarial images by measuring how far the in-
put images differ from the manifold of the normal images. The reformer pushes
the adversarial images close to the manifold of the legitimate images to help
target models to correctly predict. MagNet is the attack-independent defense
framework but it works only with the small size of images and classifier models.
Dense-GAN was introduced by Samangoeui et al. in 2018. This defense frame-
work leverages Generative Adversarial Networks(GANs)[10] to defend the deep
learning models against any adversarial attacks. Defense-GAN utilizes GANs
for the main architecture as well as Gradient Descent(GD) minimization to find
latent codes for GANs instead of using the detector network and the reformer
network. The authors believed if GAN is trained properly and has enough ca-
pacity to represent the data, its reconstructions and the original images should
not defer much. However, it is very challenging to train GANs and if GANs
are neither trained nor tuned appropriately, the performance of Defense-GAN
decreases.
In this paper, we introduce a new defense mechanism to defend the deep
learning segmentation models against the adversarial examples in medical imag-
ing. Our approach does not require the target networks to modify the model
architectures or training procedures. Moreover, it does not need to know the
information about the adversarial examples. Additionally, we use frequency do-
main of an image instead of spatial domain because we can analyze the geo-
metric characteristic of an image and show more clearly differences between a
normal image and an adversarial image in the frequency domain of image be-
cause of the difference between low and high frequency domain information. Our
contributions are as followed. Firstly, we show that our method can be robust
and generalized well against the adversarial examples for semantic segmentation
tasks in medical imaging. Secondly, we utilize a frequency domain of an image to
differentiate the legitimate examples and the adversarial examples. Thirdly, our
defense mechanism can be used for any deep learning neural network models.
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2 Methodology
The purpose of our defense strategy is to design the defense mechanism to be
robust and generalized well across any adversarial attacks. Our defense strat-
egy is similar to MagNet. The main differences between MagNet and our ap-
proach are : (1) we exploit the deep semantic segmentation models(e.g. UNet[14],
DenseNet[16]) instead of auto-encoders, (2) we utilize a frequency domain of an
image to detect the adversarial examples rather than a spatial domain of an
image. The main components in our defense strategy are the frequency domain
converter, the detector network, and the reformer network. Figure 1 demon-
strates the workflow of our approach in the test phase.
Fig. 1. The workflow of our defense strategy in the test phase
At the test time, the input image X is given to the frequency domain con-
verter at first. The role of the frequency domain converter is to convert the
spatial domain of an image into the frequency domain of an image. The detector
gets frequency domain of X ′ which is the output of the frequency domain con-
verter and then differentiates whether X ′ is the normal image or the adversarial
image by measuring the reconstruction error between X ′ and the manifold of the
normal examples, which are also in the frequency domain. If X ′ is far from the
majority boundary(i.e. the reconstruction error is large), the detector network
rejects X ′. The output of the detector is the information of indices of X ′ which
is not rejected by the detector network. We extract the passed input image Xp
by using the output of the detector. Then, the reformer pushes Xp close to the
manifold of an original image. The important point is that the reformer does
not use the frequency domain of an image for its function, but uses the spa-
tial domain of an image. At the final step, the output of the reformer network
Xrf is given as the input of the target deep segmentation models. Our defense
framework only needs these three components. Therefore, we do not need the
target networks to change training procedures as well as the model architecture.
Moreover, we do not require the information about the adversarial examples.
Frequency Domain Converter. The frequency domain converter is a func-
tion to return the frequency domain of an image from the spatial domain of an
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image. The purpose of this function is to help the detector to distinguish be-
tween the normal examples and the adversarial examples more precisely. The
frequency domain is a space that represents the sine and cosine components of
images by using the Fourier Transform[15]. In the frequency domain, each point
in domain shows a particular frequency in the spatial domain of an image. To be
more specific, high-frequency components correspond to edges or boundaries in
an image, and low-frequency components represent smooth regions in an image.
Hence, we can analyze the geometric characteristics of an image by the frequency
domain of the image. The different images have their own frequency domains.
Each frequency domain has their dominating directions, which are represented
the regular patterns in the background of the images. But, all of the frequency
domains have one thing in common. Their magnitudes get smaller for higher
frequencies. Therefore, more image information is at low frequencies than at
high frequencies. Since the frequency domain represents the rate at which the
pixel values are changing in an image, we assume that the frequency domain
shows more clearly differences between the normal examples and the adversarial
examples than the spatial domain does.
The difference between the spatial domain and the frequency domain of the
normal image and its corresponding adversarial example is as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 (b) represents the frequency domain of the clean image, whereas Figure
2 (d) represents frequency domain of the adversarial image crafted by DAG[4].
There are a couple of differences between (b) and (d). Firstly, the dominating di-
rections which are shown in (b) are blurred in (d). Also, (d) has more magnitude
for high frequencies than (b). We assume that adding small perturbations to the
clean image increases edges and breaks the regular patterns of the clean image.
Therefore, we believe that this characteristic of the frequency domain makes the
detector to differentiate the adversarial examples more precise compared to the
detector using the spatial domain.
To convert image from spatial domain to frequency domain, we use Discrete
Fourier Transform(DFT)[9] because images are discrete signal.The DFT is de-
fined as:
F (u, v) =
1
WH
W−1∑
x=0
H−1∑
y=0
f(x, y)e−j2pi(ux/W+vy/H)
where F(u,v) is the coefficient of the periodic function component with fre-
quency u in the x-axis and v in the y-axis and f(x,y) is the coefficient of the
image with the size W x H. The ranges of each component are x = 0, 1, ...,W−1,
y = 0, 1, ...,H − 1, u = 0, 1, ...,W − 1, and v = 0, 1, ...,H − 1.
However, the zero-frequency component(0,0) of the frequency domain of an
image by DFT is not at the center of the image as shown in Figure 3. It is hard
to understand the shape of the frequency domain with (b) since the magnitude
becomes bigger close to edges. If we want better to understand the frequency do-
main of an image, it is better to shift the zero-frequency component to the center
of the image. Because F(u,v) is the periodic function that is symmetric with the
origin, we can use the shift function to shift the zero-frequency component. We
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Fig. 2. The spatial domain and the frequency domain of one clean image and its
corresponding adversarial image
Fig. 3. A whole-brain MRI image in the spatial domain, the frequency domain and the
frequency domain using the shift function
evaluate the performance between the frequency domain detector without using
the shift function and with using the shift function in experiments.
Detector. The detector is a function that classifies whether the input image
is the adversarial image or the legitimate image. We utilize the distance metrics
to access the distance between the input examples and the manifold of the normal
examples. we train the detector networks with mean squared error(MSE):
MSE(X) =
1
|X|
∑
x∈X
‖x−D(x)‖2
We use a reconstruction error for our distance metrics. D is referred as the
detector. The reconstruction error RE(x) on test data x is defined:
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RE(x) = ‖x−D(x)‖p
If the input sample is drawn from the same data generation process as the
training samples which are used for training the detector, the reconstruction
error is small. Otherwise, the reconstruction error is big. Hence, we can utilize
the reconstruction error for our distance metrics to tell how far a test image
is from the majority of the normal images. Also, it is very essential to choose
suitable norms when we calculate the reconstruction errors because the norm has
a big impacts on the sharpness of detection results. Smaller p in p-norm averages
its depth to each pixel. On the other hand, a larger p is more responsive to the
maximum difference among all pixels. Empirically, we found out that 2-norm
is sufficient. Hence, we use 2-norm to calculate the reconstruction error for the
detector network.
Moreover, we must set a threshold tre to decide the decision boundary to
detect the adversarial examples since the reconstruction error is a continuous
value. Hence, the threshold is a hyperparameter which is an instance of the
detector network. The one thing to note is that we should care to select the
correct threshold. To detect little perturbed adversarial examples, the threshold
should be as low as possible. If the threshold is too low, the detector classifies
the normal examples as the adversarial examples. To choose tre , we exploit
the validation dataset including the normal examples. We calculate all of the
thresholds on the validation dataset and then we discover the highest tre below
the threshold tfp, which is the false positive rate of the detector on the validation
dataset. tfp should be chosen by the requirement of the system. We give one
example of tfp and tre to explain the relationship between them. If the tfp is set
to 0.1 by the system, the detector rejects no more than 10 % examples on the
validation dataset. So, the threshold tre is the highest value in the threshold set
which are already computed by using the validation dataset.
In MagNet, they implemented the autoencoder architecture for the detector
network. However, we assume that the autoencoder appropriately works only
with the small size images because the autoencoder architecture is simple net-
work. Hence, we utilize more complicated architectures than autoencoder archi-
tectures to have better the detector network. For this, we implement the deep
image segmentation models such as UNet and DenseNet.
Reformer. The reformer is a function to try to reconstruct the input image
to push close to the majority of the normal examples. The output of the reformer
is then given as the input to the target deep learning neural network model. The
one thing is to note that the reformer is used only at the inference time. We train
the reformer network to minimize the reconstruction error on the training dataset
including the legitimate images. Since the reformer is trained with the normal
examples, the output of the reformer should be very similar when the input image
is reconstructed in the same process as the training normal examples. However,
when the the adversarial example comes to the reformer, the reformer moves the
adversarial example closer to the majority of the normal examples. Therefore, the
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reformer can help the target deep neural network model to improve the accuracy
of the prediction of the adversarial examples while keeping the accuracy of the
prediction of the normal examples.
3 Experiments
The following sections describe experiments and results to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our defense strategy outlined in section 2. We introduce our setup for
the experiment. Then, we evaluate the performance of the detector networks,
as well as we compare our defense approach and MagNet under the adversarial
attacks.
Setup. Since we are motivated by the paper where Paschali. M. et al., eval-
uated the performance of SegNet[18], UNet and DenseNet in unseen clean and
adversarial examples[13], we also select the same segmentation models(SegNet,
UNet and DenseNet) for our target models to evaluate the performance of our
defense method against the adversarial examples. SegNet does not have skip con-
nection, UNet has long-range skip connections and DenseNet has long-range and
short-range skip connections. In the paper [13], DenseNet shows the best robust-
ness results against adversarial attacks and noisy attacks because of long-range
and short-range skip connections followed by UNet and SegNet.
The semantic segmentation models are trained with the special loss function[1]
combined with weighted multi-class logistic loss and Dice loss [7]. The loss func-
tion is
L = −
∑
x
w(x)gl(x)log(pl(x)))− 2
∑
x pl(x)gl(x)∑
x p
2
l (x) +
∑
x g
2
l (x)
where the estimated probability of pixel x belonging to class l represents
pl(x) and the its actual class is gl(x). The first term is the weighted multi-class
logistic loss and the second term is the Dice loss. The details are described in
the paper written by Roy. AG. et al.[1]. Model optimization is performed with
ADAM optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.001.
For our experiments, we use special MRI data from the publicly-available
whole-brain segmentation benchmark which is a subset of Open Access Series
of Imaging Studies(OASIS)[6]. OASIS dataset has 35 different volumes. The
OASIS dataset consists of three-dimensional images, but we split the dataset
into two-dimensional images. The adversarial examples are crafted for all of the
trained segmentation models by using DAG. To measure the performance of the
semantic segmentation models, we use Dice score [8].
To compare our defense framework and MagNet, we implement two segmen-
tation models(UNet, DenseNet) for our detector and reformer. For the detector,
we use the training dataset that is trained for the semantic segmentation models.
But, we transform the training dataset from the spatial domain to the frequency
domain. For the reformer, we train the training examples in the spatial domain.
The optimizer is ADAM which is set to the initial learning rate of 0.001 and we
use L2 regularization.
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Evaluation for Detection. We evaluate the performance of the different
detector architectures. The purpose of this experiment is not only to compare
the auto-encoder architectures and the segmentation architectures that we imple-
ment for our detector network, but also to compare the detector based on the fre-
quency domain and the detector based on the spatial domain. For this, we utilize
the Receiver Operating Characteristics(ROC) - Area Under The Curve(AUC)
curve [2].
For this experiment, we design the new OASIS dataset including the normal
examples and all types of the adversarial examples crafted by DAG that sets for
the three trained segmentation models. The ratio of each examples is the normal
examples (50 %), DAG adversarial examples (50 %).
Table 1. The ROC-AUC score of each detector network
ROC AUC score %
UNet SegNet DenseNet Average
Autoencoder I 54.27 57.87 57.18 56.44
Autoencoder II 53.17 56.09 56.10 55.12
UNet spatial 84.58 97.36 92.49 91.48
DenseNet spatial 80.29 95.21 87.56 87.69
UNet frequency 52.74 53.81 52.90 53.15
DenseNet frequency 52.39 55.35 55.49 54.41
UNet shiftFrequency 96.12 98.82 99.34 98.09
DenseNet shiftFrequency 90.62 98.09 97.42 95.38
Table 1 shows the ROC-AUC score of the different detectors. Autoencoder
I and autoencoder II for MagNet show that they are not capable of discerning
the adversarial examples. Our methods with the segmentation models in the
spatial domain demonstrate the good performance of classification. Now, we
observe the detectors based on the frequency domain. The UNet and DenseNet
frequency domain detectors without using the shift function show bad capacity
to distinguish between the adversarial examples and the legitimate examples.
However, the frequency domain detectors using the shift function show very
good measurement of separability
As a result, this experiment provides empirical pieces of evidence to our as-
sumptions. Firstly, deep segmentation models achieve better performance than
auto-encoders because auto-encoders cannot differentiate the big size of adver-
sarial images and normal images. Lastly, the detector can differentiate the nor-
mal examples and the adversarial examples better when the detector uses the
frequency domain instead of the spatial domain.
Overall Performance against Adversarial Attacks. We evaluate dif-
ferent defense architectures including MagNet and our defense method against
the DAG adversarial attacks. Firstly, we introduce the different defense architec-
tures for the detectors and the reformers. Then, we evaluate the different defense
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architectures for the trained segmentation models using the DAG adversarial at-
tacks.
Table 2. The Combination of Detector and Reformer networks
Detector Reformer Detector Reformer
1 Autoencoder I Autoencoder I 9 UNet frequency UNet
2 Autoencoder I Autoencoder II 10 UNet frequency DenseNet
3 Autoencoder II Autoencoder I 11 DenseNet frequency UNet
4 Autoencoder II Autoencoder II 12 DenseNet frequency DenseNet
5 Autoencoder I UNet 13 UNet shiftFrequency UNet
6 Autoencoder I DenseNet 14 UNet shiftFrequency DenseNet
7 Autoencoder II UNet 15 DenseNet shiftFrequency UNet
8 Autoencoder II DenseNet 16 DenseNet shiftFrequency DenseNet
Table 2 depicts all the combinations of the detector and the reformer net-
works for experiments. Diversified defense architectures boost the defense per-
formance. The total number of defense architectures is 16. The combinations of
the defense architectures are between the number 1 and the number 4 for Mag-
Net. To compare the performance of the reformers between the auto-encoders
and the segmentation models, we design the defense architectures which include
the auto-encoders for the detector and the segmentation models for reformer in
the number 5 to the number 8. The number 9 to the number 16, we design the
frequency domain detectors using UNet and DenseNet. The difference between
”frequency” and ”shiftFrequency” is that the ”shiftFrequency” detectors use the
shift function. In this experiment, we do not use the detectors using the seg-
mentation models for the spatial domain because our main idea of the defense
framework uses the detector for the frequency domain rather than the spatial
domain, as well as we already empirically proved that the frequency domain de-
tector has better power to detect adversarial examples than the spatial domain
detector.
Since we have the 16 different defense architectures, we can evaluate the per-
formances of the reformer networks between the auto-encoders and the segmen-
tation models as well as the performances of the detectors between the spatial
domain and the frequency domain. Lastly, we can ultimately measure the per-
formance of the defense strategies between our defense method and MagNet. For
convenience, we refer to the combination of the defense architectures between
the number 1 and the number 16 as between (1) and (16).
Figure 4 demonstrates the overall performances of the diversified defense
architectures for the semantic segmentation models(SegNet, UNet, DenseNet)
with the average score against all of the DAG adversarial attacks. We choose
the false positive rate of the detector on the validation set tfp to 0.05 to set the
threshold of reconstruction error tre.
In Figure 4, we can compare the performance of each semantic segmentation
model without defense. DenseNet shows the best dice score against DAG adver-
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Fig. 4. Bar charts for the average Dice scores of SegNet,UNet and DenseNet using the
different defense strategies against all of the attacks
sarial attacks followed by UNet and SegNet. Therefore, we can say that the skip
connections help to be robust against adversarial attacks.
Firstly, we look at the bar charts of SegNet with the different defense strate-
gies. MagNet((1)∼ (4)) slightly improves the performance rather than no defense
SegNet. Compared with the reformer networks between the auto-encoders((1)
∼ (4)) and the segmentation models, the DenseNet reformers((6),(7)) show the
same or less performances than the auto-encoders, but the performance of the
UNet reformers((5),(7)) improves around 10 % better than the auto-encoders.
Compared with the frequency domain detectors((9) ∼ (16)), the UNet shift fre-
quency domain detectors((13),(14)) achieve the better performances than the
UNet no shift frequency domain detectors((9),(10)). The DenseNet shift fre-
quency domain detectors((15),(16)) also shows the better achievements than the
DenseNet no shift frequency domain detectors((11),(12)). Furthermore, we can
compare the detectors between the auto-encoders((5) ∼ (8)) and the segmenta-
tion models using the shift function in the frequency domain((13) ∼ (16)). We
observe that the shift frequency domain detectors have better achievements than
the auto-encoders detectors. In conclusion, the shift frequency domain detector
using UNet and the UNet reformer network (13) shows the best Dice score accu-
racy compared with the other defense strategies followed by (15). Furthermore,
our defense mechanism(13) achieves better than MagNet in SegNet.
Secondly, we observe the bar charts of UNet. MagNet((1) ∼ (4)) shows the
worse average Dice score than no defense UNet. The combinations with detectors
using the auto-encoders and the DenseNet reformers((6), (8)) also display that
they are not able to defend against the adversarial examples. The defense strate-
gies with the shift frequency domain detectors and the DenseNet reformers((10),
(12)) show the bad performances too. We only observe that the defense strategies
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using the UNet reformers((5), (7), (9), (11), (13), (15)) are capable of defending
against the adversarial attacks. The reformers using UNet architecture ((5), (7))
show better achievements 17 % than the reformers using the auto-encoders((1)
∼ (4)). The shift frequency domains((13) ∼ (16)) achieve more than 7 % than
than the auto-encoders detectors((5) ∼ (8)). The best performance of the de-
fense strategy is the shift frequency domain detector using UNet and the UNet
reformer(13). This strategy shows around 23 % better performance than Mag-
Net(2).
Next, we observe the overall performances of DenseNet using the different
defense combinations. DenseNet also shows that MagNet ((1) ∼ (4)) is not very
useful to defend against the adversarial attacks. The defense strategies using the
UNet reformer((5), (7), (9), (11), (13), (15)) achieve better Dice scores than the
defense strategies using the DenseNet reformer((6), (8), (10), (12), (14), (16)).
The shift frequency domain detectors((13) ∼ (16)) show better achievements
than the auto-encoder detectors((5) ∼ (8)). The reformer using segmentation
models((5) ∼ (8)) are more powerful to defend facing the adversarial attacks
compared with the reformer using the auto-encoders((1) ∼ (4)). The defense
strategy(13) shows the best performance among the other defense strategies and
the other semantic segmentation models.
In conclusion, these experiments result provide empirical shreds of evidence
of our assumptions. Firstly, the reformer using the UNet has better capability
to move closer to the majority of the original examples than auto-encoders.
Secondly, the shift frequency domain which has zero frequency component is
located at the center of an image helps the detector networks to differentiate
the adversarial examples and the normal examples more accurately than the
spatial domain as well as the frequency domain without using the shift function.
Finally, the experiment results prove that our new defense strategy is powerful
and generalized well to the various adversarial attacks.
4 Conclusion
We proposed the new defense methodology for defending the medical image se-
mantic segmentation models against adversarial attacks. Our defense framework
improves the prediction accuracy and decreases the power of the adversarial at-
tacks. Furthermore, our defense framework is attack-independent. Besides, our
method is independent of the target deep learning neural network models. These
characteristics of our defense method lead to better generalization across the ad-
versarial attacks.
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